Minimum Wages, Employer-Provided Health Insurance, and the Non-discrimination Law

被引:21
|
作者
Marks, Mindy S. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Riverside, Dept Econ, Riverside, CA 92521 USA
来源
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS | 2011年 / 50卷 / 02期
关键词
FRINGE BENEFITS; JOB; COVERAGE;
D O I
10.1111/j.1468-232X.2011.00635.x
中图分类号
F24 [劳动经济];
学科分类号
020106 ; 020207 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
This article exploits cross-state variation in minimum wages to investigate the impact of minimum wage changes on employer-provided health insurance. In contrast to the existing empirical literature, this article considers an environment where some firms are constrained by non-discrimination laws that govern the provision of health insurance. For these firms, minimum wage changes do not reduce the probability that workers will receive employer-provided health insurance. For firms not covered by the non-discrimination law, and free to tailor their fringe benefits, low-skilled workers experience a disproportionate reduction in the availability and generosity of health insurance after a minimum wage increase.
引用
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页码:241 / 262
页数:22
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