ENVY-FREE MAKESPAN APPROXIMATION

被引:4
|
作者
Cohen, Edith [1 ]
Feldman, Michal [2 ]
Fiat, Amos [3 ]
Kaplan, Haim [3 ]
Olonetsky, Svetlana [3 ]
机构
[1] AT&T Labs Res, Florham Pk, NJ 07932 USA
[2] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Sch Business Adm, IL-91905 Jerusalem, Israel
[3] Tel Aviv Univ, Blavatnik Sch Comp Sci, IL-69978 Tel Aviv, Israel
基金
以色列科学基金会;
关键词
scheduling; envy-free; algorithmic mechanism design;
D O I
10.1137/100801597
中图分类号
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号
081202 ;
摘要
We study envy-free mechanisms for assigning tasks to agents, where every task may take a different amount of time to perform by each agent, and the goal is to get all the tasks done as soon as possible (i.e., minimize the makespan). For indivisible tasks, we put forward an envy-free polynomial mechanism that approximates the minimal makespan to within a factor of O(log m), where m is the number of machines. This bound is almost tight, as we also show that no envy-free mechanism can achieve a better bound than O(log m/log log m). This improves the recent result of Mu'alem [On multi-dimensional envy-free mechanisms, in Proceedings of the First International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory, F. Rossi and A. Tsoukias, eds., Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci. 5783, Springer, Berlin, 2009, pp. 120-131] who introduced the model and gave an upper bound of (m + 1)/2 and a lower bound of 2 - 1/m. For divisible tasks, we show that there always exists an envy-free poly-time mechanism with optimal makespan. Finally, we demonstrate how our mechanism for envy-free makespan minimization can be interpreted as a market clearing problem.
引用
收藏
页码:12 / 25
页数:14
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