Electoral Handouts in Mumbai Elections The Cost of Political Competition

被引：16
|
作者：
Chauchard, Simon [1 ]
机构：
[1] Dartmouth Coll, Govt, Hanover, NH 03755 USA
来源：
ASIAN SURVEY | 2018年 / 58卷 / 02期
关键词：
India; clientelism; handouts; elections; political competition; MACHINE POLITICS; VOTE; CLIENTELISM; TURNOUT;
D O I：
10.1525/AS.2018.58.2.341
中图分类号：
K9 [地理];
学科分类号：
0705 ;
摘要：
Why do candidates give voters handouts during political campaigns? Drawing on qualitative data from Mumbai, this article argues that competitive elections prompt candidates to distribute handouts for strategic reasons. While they know handouts to be inefficient, candidates face a prisoner's dilemma. Fearing that their opponents will distribute handouts, they distribute them themselves to counter, or neutralize, their opponents' strategies.
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页码：341 / 364
页数：24
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