Financing divided and unified partisan governments

被引:0
|
作者
Heckelman, JC [1 ]
机构
[1] Wake Forest Univ, Winston Salem, NC 27109 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1080/135048598354041
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
By modifying Berument's divided government-optimum financing model to include partisan interests, it is found that when the Democratic party controls both the Congress and Presidency, real monetary base grows at a higher rate than when the Republican party controls both branches. In addition, it is found that monetary base grows at the slowest rate when neither party controls both branches, supporting a gridlock version of divided government.
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页码:789 / 791
页数:3
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