Recombinant estimation for normal-form games, with applications to auctions and bargaining

被引:24
|
作者
Mullin, CH
Reiley, DH [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Arizona, Dept Econ, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA
[2] Bates White, Washington, DC 20006 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
simultaneous-move games; experimental statistics;
D O I
10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.001
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
When analyzing economic games, researchers frequently estimate quantities describing group outcomes, such as the expected revenue in an auction. For such applications, we propose an improved statistical estimation technique called "recombinant estimation." The technique takes observations of players' strategies and recombines them to compute all possible group outcomes that could have resulted from different player combinations. In applications to an auction and a bargaining game, the improved efficiency of our estimator is equivalent to increasing the sample size between 25 and 200%. We discuss how to design experiments in order to utilize recombinant estimation. We also discuss practical computational issues, and provide software for computing estimates and standard errors. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:159 / 182
页数:24
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] The supercore for normal-form games
    Inarra, Elena
    Larrea, Ma. Concepcion
    Saracho, Ana I.
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 2007, 132 (01) : 530 - 538
  • [2] THE NORMAL-FORM OF THE EXTENSIVE GAMES
    GURVICH, VA
    [J]. DOKLADY AKADEMII NAUK SSSR, 1982, 264 (01): : 30 - 33
  • [3] NORMAL-FORM STRUCTURES IN EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES
    MAILATH, GJ
    SAMUELSON, L
    SWINKELS, JM
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1994, 64 (02) : 325 - 371
  • [4] EXTENSIVE FORM REASONING IN NORMAL-FORM GAMES
    MAILATH, GJ
    SAMUELSON, L
    SWINKELS, JM
    [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1993, 61 (02) : 273 - 302
  • [5] Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games
    P. Jean-Jacques Herings
    Vincent J. Vannetelbosch
    [J]. International Journal of Game Theory, 1999, 28 : 53 - 68
  • [6] EVOLUTIONARY SELECTION IN NORMAL-FORM GAMES
    RITZBERGER, K
    WEIBULL, JW
    [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1995, 63 (06) : 1371 - 1399
  • [7] Essential equilibria in normal-form games
    Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 2010, 145 (01) : 421 - 431
  • [8] Beliefs and (in)stability in normal-form games
    Kyle Hyndman
    Antoine Terracol
    Jonathan Vaksmann
    [J]. Experimental Economics, 2022, 25 : 1146 - 1172
  • [9] DYNAMIC SELECTION IN NORMAL-FORM GAMES
    Meertens, Marc
    Potters, Jos
    Reijnierse, Hans
    [J]. INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW, 2006, 8 (03) : 395 - 416
  • [10] Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games
    Herings, PJJ
    Vannetelbosch, VJ
    [J]. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 1999, 28 (01) : 53 - 68