Index membership vs. loss of voting power: The unification of dual-class shares

被引:1
|
作者
Betzer, Andre [1 ]
van den Bongard, Inga [2 ]
Goergen, Marc [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] BUW, Schumpeter Sch Business & Econ, Gaussstr 20, D-42119 Wuppertal, Germany
[2] Univ Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany
[3] Cardiff Univ, Cardiff, S Glam, Wales
[4] ECGI, Brussels, Belgium
关键词
Private benefits of control; Dual-class stock; Ownership structure; Corporate governance; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; PRIVATE BENEFITS; DEMAND CURVES; ONE VOTE; PRICE; MARKET; STOCKS; FIRMS; SHAREHOLDERS; GOVERNANCE;
D O I
10.1016/j.intfin.2017.03.003
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
A change in the index selection rules of Deutsche Borse provides a unique opportunity to investigate the drivers behind the decision to abolish dual-class shares. As of June 2002, selection is based on the market capitalization of the free-float of the more liquid share class rather than the overall market capitalization. Hence, firms have had to reassess the benefits from their dual-class shares by weighing them against the cost from foregone index weight associated with having two share classes. Our findings suggest that index membership significantly affects the controlling shareholder's motivation to unify preferred and common stock. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:140 / 153
页数:14
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