Analysis of Capacity-Constrained Sequential Auctions in Duopoly Market Environment

被引：0
|
作者：
Zhang, Z. [1 ]
Jin, M. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Mississippi State Univ, Dept Ind & Syst Engn, Starkville, MS USA
来源：
2009 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING AND ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT, VOLS 1-4 | 2009年
关键词：
sequential auctions; bidding strategies; capacity constrained;
D O I：
10.1109/IEEM.2009.5373091
中图分类号：
T [工业技术];
学科分类号：
08 ;
摘要：
Sequential auctions with the Vickrey-Clarke-Glove (VCG) mechanism are proposed for two buyers to purchase multiple units of an identical item. The suppliers in a duopoly market environment are assumed to have capacity constraints of providing the required product. Three research problems are studied: the suppliers' expected payoff functions, the suppliers' bidding strategies in the first auction, and the buyers' procurement costs. Both suppliers' dominant bidding strategies are theoretically derived. Suppliers' expected profits and buyers' expected procurement costs are empirically analyzed.
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页码：2212 / 2216
页数：5
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