Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency

被引：3
|
作者：
Huang, Sheng-Chieh
Luo, Xiao [1 ]
机构：
[1] Acad Sinica, Inst Econ, Taipei 115, Taiwan
[2] Natl Taiwan Univ, Inst Econ, Taipei 100, Taiwan
来源：
ECONOMIC THEORY | 2008年 / 34卷 / 02期
基金：
英国经济与社会研究理事会;
关键词：
sequential rationality; subgame consistency; stable sets; SSE;
D O I：
10.1007/s00199-006-0187-2
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In this paper we analyze dynamic strategic behavior by means of the idea of "stability." We develop a solution concept of "sequentially stable equilibrium (SSE)" that satisfies subgame consistency. All SSEs are characterized by the largest stable set that yields exactly all the backward induction outcomes. We also provide a refinement of the SSE. We compare the SSE and its refinement with some existing solution concepts in the literature.
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页码：309 / 329
页数：21
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