OR in marketing;
Marketing channels;
Advertising;
Differential games;
Brand reputation;
MODELS;
MANUFACTURER;
D O I:
10.1016/j.ejor.2017.11.060
中图分类号:
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号:
12 ;
1201 ;
1202 ;
120202 ;
摘要:
We consider a dynamic marketing channel comprising of one manufacturer and one retailer, where consumer demand depends on price and on brand reputation. We investigate two scenarios. In the first one, the retailer may also invest in brand advertising, while in the second, it does not. Comparing the results of the two scenarios yields interesting insights into the impact of the retailer's brand advertising. Findings include that when the retailer invests in the brand's reputation, both players achieve higher profits and the consumer obtains a higher surplus. This gives the retailer's brand advertising a (partial) channel coordination flavor, a result that has never before been reported in the literature. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机构:
Department of Marketing, NUS Business School, National University of Singapore
NUS Business School, National University of SingaporeDepartment of Marketing, NUS Business School, National University of Singapore
Lee Y.H.
Han C.Y.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Department of Marketing, NUS Business School, National University of Singapore
NUS Business School, National University of SingaporeDepartment of Marketing, NUS Business School, National University of Singapore