The Problem of Knowledge in the Critical-Rationalistic Conception of Hans Albert

This article presents the particular treatment of selected epistemological problems in the framework of Hans Albert's critical rationalism. The first part examines the question of whether true knowledge is possible. In his endeavour to address this question, Albert firstly distinguishes himself from classical epistemologists who connect true knowledge with the justification of certain truth. He shows that the requirement that knowledge must provide final justification leads to irresolvable paradoxes, if not to dogmatism. The justifying claims of classical epistemology, therefore, are strictly rejected in the framework of critical rationalism, and Albert postulates the permanent openess of all knowledge to critique. In the second part, the paper then focuses on Albert's specific understanding of the question of whether pure theory of knowledge is possible. Albert, in looking for an answer to this question, distinguishes his own approach from that of Immanuel Kant's transcendental idealism. At the same time, however, he is to an extent inspired by Kant, and he describes his own position as trancendental realism.