Delay Measurement of 0-RTT Transport Layer Security (TLS) Handshake Protocol

被引:0
|
作者
Goncharskyi, Danylo [1 ]
Kim, Sung Yong [1 ]
Serhrouchni, Ahmed [1 ]
Gu, Pengwenlong [1 ]
Khatoun, Rida [1 ]
Hachem, Joel [2 ]
机构
[1] Inst Polytech Paris, Telecom Paris, LTCI, Paris, France
[2] Rochester Univ, Rochester Hills, MI 48307 USA
关键词
Transport Layer Security; 0-rtt handshake protocol; Early data; Performance measurement; Benchmarking;
D O I
10.1109/CODIT55151.2022.9803984
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3 was normalised in 2018, in which an efficient 0-rtt handshake protocol was proposed. For future 5G networks, the 0-RTT handshake will be a more suitable choice for both secrecy and efficiency. However, 4 years after it was proposed, the 0-rtt handshake protocol is still not widely accepted by network service providers due to concerns about its ability to resist replay attacks. In order to address this issue, many solutions have be proposed in the past few year but all of them will increase the complexity and overhead of the 0-RTT protocol. In this paper, we focus on testing whether the 0-RTT handshake protocol is supported by service providers, and testing its performance in a real network environment to verify whether it can withstand continuous optimization in terms of security. Test results show that with 0-RTT, the server received the first application data up to 37 time faster than the 1-RTT and up to 83 time faster than 2-RTT. However, at the client side, the performance of 0-RTT protocol is virtually the same as 1-RTT, as predicted.
引用
收藏
页码:1450 / 1454
页数:5
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