Analysts' reliance on industry-level versus firm-specific information: Implications for information production

被引:2
|
作者
Choi, Hae Mi [1 ]
Gupta-Mukherjee, Swasti [1 ]
机构
[1] Loyola Univ, Quinlan Sch Business, Chicago, IL 60660 USA
关键词
Analyst forecasts; Rational inattention; Analyst incentives; Forecast accuracy; Forecast frequency; EARNINGS FORECASTS; LIMITED ATTENTION; CAREER CONCERNS; ACCURACY; PERFORMANCE; MANAGEMENT; INVESTORS; MARKET; REPUTATION; REVISIONS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2022.106555
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Motivated by models of rational inattention, we study the information choices of sell-side analysts who face attention constraints in acquiring and processing costly information. We empirically examine analysts' relative reliance on industry-level (i.e. macro) and firm-specific (i.e. micro) information in generating firms' earnings forecasts. We find that analysts' reliance on industry-level relative to firm-specific information decreases with available resources and their incentives to allocate effort towards firm-specific research. Specifically, analysts' relative reliance on industry-level information increases with the number of firms and industries covered, while it decreases with brokerage size and experience. Analysts' relative reliance on industry-level information decreases when they face more competition and cover firms with more career-related potential rewards for firm-specific research, such as large firms, and firms with high trading volume and institutional ownership. Moreover, analysts who rely relatively more on industry-level information issue less accurate but more frequent forecasts. Together, the evidence is consistent with analysts' reliance on industry-level versus firm-specific information indicating a strategic allocation of effort among different aspects of information production, i.e. quality and quantity of earnings forecasts. (c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页数:15
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