The political origin of differences in long-term economic prosperity: centralization versus decentralization

被引:2
|
作者
Feng, Chen [1 ]
Shi, Beibei [2 ]
Xu, Ming [3 ]
机构
[1] Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Publ Econ & Adm, Guoding Ave 777, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
[2] Northwest Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Xuefu Ave 1, Xian 710127, Peoples R China
[3] Chinese Acad Social Sci, Inst Ind Econ, Yuetan North St 2, Beijing 100037, Peoples R China
关键词
Political institutions; Centralization; Decentralization; TS; Long-term economic prosperity; GROWTH; CHINA; STATE;
D O I
10.1007/s11698-020-00203-4
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
It is important to understand the political determinants of long-term economic prosperity. In Sichuan Province of China, there historically existed two long-standing political institutions: a centralized system, represented by the prefecture system, and a decentralized system, represented by the Tusi system. This study utilizes a unique historical dataset for 181 counties in Sichuan Province and implements a regression discontinuity design to estimate the impact of different institutions on long-term economic development. The results indicate that the Tusi system significantly suppressed the performance of the local economy and impeded current regional openness and urbanization. By tracing the channels of its persistent effect, we document that the influence of these historical institutions has persisted mainly through the shaping of human capital and state capacity. The Tusi system is not only harmful to cultural communication and local educational progress but also inhibits the government's capacity and the formation of authoritarianism.
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页码:581 / 639
页数:59
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