Reputation Leaders, Quality Laggards: Incentive Structure in Markets with Both Private and Collective Reputations

被引：21

作者：

Costanigro, Marco ^{[1
]}

Bond, Craig A. ^{[1
]}

McCluskey, Jill J. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Colorado State Univ, Dept Agr & Resource Econ, Ft Collins, CO 80523 USA

[2] Washington State Univ, Sch Econ Sci, Pullman, WA 99164 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS | 2012年 / 63卷 / 02期

关键词：

Collective reputation; dynamic games; firm reputation; geographical indications; information and product quality; L14; L15; Q14; INFORMATION; PRICE; EXPERIENCE; ECONOMICS; CHOICE; NAME;

D O I：

10.1111/j.1477-9552.2011.00331.x

中图分类号：

F3 [农业经济];

学科分类号：

0202 ; 020205 ; 1203 ;

摘要：

A theoretical model is developed to illustrate the economic incentives to invest in quality in markets with a dual reputation structure: private (firm reputation) and collective (regional reputation). Numerical dynamic programming techniques are then used to simulate firms strategic behaviour, and competitive outcomes are compared to the optimal investment of a regional planner. Market and product characteristics inducing asymmetric and/or sub-optimal investment strategies, potentially destabilising for the region, are investigated.

引用

页码：245 / 264

页数：20