Signalling capacity and crisis diplomacy: Explaining the failure of 'maximum pressure' in the 2017 US-North Korea nuclear crisis

被引:3
|
作者
Bakich, Spencer D. [1 ]
机构
[1] Virginia Mil Inst, Dept Int Studies & Polit Sci, Lexington, VA 24450 USA
关键词
Nuclear weapons; coercive diplomacy; United States; North Korea; signalling; audience costs; brinkmanship; THREATS; BALANCE; DEBATE;
D O I
10.1080/01402390.2020.1755960
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
In the 2017 U.S.-North Korea nuclear crisis, the Trump administration's 'maximum pressure' strategy failed to achieve its objectives of the complete, irreversible, verifiable denuclearization (CVID) of the DPRK, and induced escalation pressures that brought the two countries to the brink of war. A deficit in signalling capacity (i.e. biased intelligence portfolio, lack of diplomatic-military integration, and inflexible military doctrine and war plans) prevented Washington from managing the crisis, creating the conditions for its strategic failure. The signalling capacity framework offers a comprehensive approach to explaining the outcome of the 2017 crisis, outperforming audience cost and brinkmanship theories.
引用
收藏
页码:692 / 717
页数:26
相关论文
共 8 条