Privacy protection-based incentive mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing

被引:11
|
作者
Tao, Dan [1 ]
Wu, Tin-Yu [2 ]
Zhu, Shaojun [1 ]
Guizani, Mohsen [3 ]
机构
[1] Beijing Jiaotong Univ, Sch Elect & Informat Engn, Beijing, Peoples R China
[2] Natl Ilan Univ, Dept Comp Sci & Informat Engn, Yilan, Taiwan
[3] Univ Idaho, Dept Elect & Comp Engn, Moscow, ID 83843 USA
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Mobile crowdsensing; Incentive mechanism; Privacy protection; Third party; Credit; Data quality; DESIGN; TASKS;
D O I
10.1016/j.comcom.2020.03.027
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) has been an emerging technology thanks to the smart devices which are capable of sensing and computing to achieve large-scale, complex sensing tasks by cooperation. However, large-scale deployment might be impeded due to that fact that the participant may face the risk of privacy leakage, and if they are not compensated favorably, they may not be willing to contribute sensing capability. To overcome the above challenges, we propose an incentive mechanism for privacy-preserving mobile crowdsensing. More specifically, we introduce a trusted third party and combine partially blind signature, which can effectively reduce the correlation between participants and data and the number of interactions between users and task platform, so as to achieve high level participant privacy. In addition, considering data quality, we define some concepts including data quality relevance, user credit, location relevance and user utility, and design a Credit-based Incentive Mechanism (CIM) based on marginal benefit density and credit, in order to obtain the maximum benefit of a task platform under given budget. Extensive simulations are carried out to show that the proposed incentive mechanism achieves superior performance compared with state-of-the-art solutions. To the existing multi-stage incentive solutions, our proposed solution can achieve higher-quality data at the expense of less time efficiency.
引用
收藏
页码:201 / 210
页数:10
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] A Privacy-Preserving Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing Based on Blockchain
    Tong, Fei
    Zhou, Yuanhang
    Wang, Kaiming
    Cheng, Guang
    Niu, Jianyu
    He, Shibo
    [J]. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 2024, 21 (06) : 5071 - 5085
  • [2] Privacy-Preserving Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing
    Wan, Tao
    Yue, Shixin
    Liao, Weichuan
    [J]. SECURITY AND COMMUNICATION NETWORKS, 2021, 2021
  • [3] Privacy-aware Incentive Mechanism Framework for Mobile Crowdsensing
    Zhu, Shaojun
    Tao, Dan
    [J]. 2019 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CONSUMER ELECTRONICS - TAIWAN (ICCE-TW), 2019,
  • [4] Achieving Incentive, Security, and Scalable Privacy Protection in Mobile Crowdsensing Services
    Xiong, Jinbo
    Ma, Rong
    Chen, Lei
    Tian, Youliang
    Lin, Li
    Jin, Biao
    [J]. WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS & MOBILE COMPUTING, 2018,
  • [5] Privacy-Preserving Auction-based Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing Systems
    Xu, Naiting
    Han, Kai
    Tang, Shaojie
    Xu, Shuai
    Li, Feiyang
    Zhang, Jiahao
    [J]. PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2018 IEEE 22ND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK IN DESIGN ((CSCWD)), 2018, : 390 - 395
  • [6] A reverse auction based incentive mechanism for mobile crowdsensing
    Ji, Guoliang
    Zhang, Baoxian
    Yao, Zheng
    Li, Cheng
    [J]. ICC 2019 - 2019 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICATIONS (ICC), 2019,
  • [7] Synergistic Based Social Incentive Mechanism in Mobile Crowdsensing
    Liu, Can
    Zeng, Feng
    Li, Wenjia
    [J]. WIRELESS ALGORITHMS, SYSTEMS, AND APPLICATIONS (WASA 2018), 2018, 10874 : 767 - 772
  • [8] An incentive mechanism with privacy protection in mobile crowdsourcing systems
    Wang, Yingjie
    Cai, Zhipeng
    Yin, Guisheng
    Gao, Yang
    Tong, Xiangrong
    Wu, Guanying
    [J]. COMPUTER NETWORKS, 2016, 102 : 157 - 171
  • [9] Privacy-Preserving Incentive Mechanisms for Mobile Crowdsensing
    Zhang, Xinglin
    Liang, Lingyu
    Luo, Chengwen
    Cheng, Long
    [J]. IEEE PERVASIVE COMPUTING, 2018, 17 (03) : 47 - 57
  • [10] A Reverse Auction-Based Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing
    Ji, Guoliang
    Yao, Zheng
    Zhang, Baoxian
    Li, Cheng
    [J]. IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL, 2020, 7 (09) : 8238 - 8248