Strategic communication by regulatory agencies as a form of reputation management: A strategic agenda

被引:33
|
作者
Maor, Moshe [1 ]
机构
[1] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Dept Polit Sci, IL-91905 Jerusalem, Israel
关键词
ORGANIZATIONAL REPUTATION; MEDIA; ACCOUNTABILITY; BLAME; IMAGE; RISK; TRANSPARENCY; PERFORMANCE; RESPONSES; IDENTITY;
D O I
10.1111/padm.12667
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
This article develops a strategic agenda concerning regulatory agencies' strategic communication in light of the reputation literature. It highlights the main strands in this literature, presents the fundamental findings discovered so far, responds to the critiques that have recently surfaced, and offers guidance about where scholarship on strategic communication might most profitably head. The critiques discussed here centre on two aspects: (i) the claim that an agency's communication choices are to some extent driven by the distinctive logic of the media rather than by reputational concerns, and (ii) the argument that strategic communication provides only short-term solutions to emerging threats and is therefore overemphasized in the literature. Future agendas include, for example, the selection of audience segmentation strategies, and the management of competing and even contradictory communication for segmented audiences when agencies enjoy exclusive jurisdiction, as opposed to cases in which other agencies share the same stage.
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页码:1044 / 1055
页数:12
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