Pigouvian Tolls and Welfare Optimality with Parallel Servers and Heterogeneous Customers

被引:1
|
作者
Bodas, Tejas [1 ]
Ganesh, Ayalvadi [2 ]
Manjunath, D. [3 ]
机构
[1] IIT Dharwad, Dept Elect Engn, Dharwad, Karnataka, India
[2] Univ Bristol, Sch Math, Bristol, Avon, England
[3] Indian Inst Technol, Dept Elect Engn, Mumbai, Maharashtra, India
关键词
Congestion games; Wardrop equilibrium; Discrete choice model; Pigouvian taxes; PRIORITY AUCTIONS; QUEUE; EQUILIBRIUM; MULTICLASS; SYSTEMS;
D O I
10.1007/s41745-021-00258-w
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
Congestion externalities are a well-known phenomenon in transportation and communication networks, healthcare etc. Optimization by self-interested agents in such settings typically results in equilibria which are sub-optimal for social welfare. Pigouvian taxes or tolls, which impose a user charge equal to the negative externality caused by the marginal user to other users, are a mechanism for combating this problem. In this paper, we study a non-atomic congestion game in which heterogeneous agents choose amongst a finite set of heterogeneous servers. The delay at a server is an increasing function of its load. Agents differ in their sensitivity to delay. We show that, while selfish optimisation by agents is sub-optimal for social welfare, imposing admission charges at the servers equal to the Pigouvian tax causes the user equilibrium to maximize social welfare. In addition, we characterize the structure of welfare optimal and of equilibrium allocations.
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页码:431 / 442
页数:12
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