Disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry

被引：6
|
作者：
Chen, Bo [1 ]
Ma, Lijun [2 ,3 ]
Zhu, Zhaobo [4 ]
Zhou, Yu [5 ,6 ]
机构：
[1] King Fahd Univ Petr & Minerals, KFUPM Business Sch, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia
[2] Shenzhen Univ, Coll Management, Shenzhen, Peoples R China
[3] Shenzhen Univ, Inst Big Data Intelligent Management & Decis, Shenzhen, Peoples R China
[4] Shenzhen Univ, Shenzhen Audencia Business Sch, Shenzhen, Peoples R China
[5] Wuhan Univ, Econ & Management Sch, Wuhan, Peoples R China
[6] Hong Kong Univ Sci & Technol, HKUST Business Sch, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2020年 / 186卷
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
Contest; All-pay auction; Stochastic entry; Bid cap; Disclosure; INFORMATION; CONTESTS;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108805
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper examines the effects of disclosing the actual number of bidders in contests with stochastic entry and with resource constraint. We study an all-pay auction with complete information. The auction entails one prize and n potential bidders. Each potential bidder has an exogenous probability of participation and faces an exogenous bid cap. It is shown that the contest organizer prefers fully concealing the information about the number of participating bidders. We extend the result to a case with endogenous entry. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页数：5
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