Open-Mindedness and Disagreement

被引:2
|
作者
Spiegel, James S. [1 ]
机构
[1] Taylor Univ, Dept Philosophy, 236 West Reade Ave, Upland, IN 46989 USA
关键词
conciliationism; disagreement; epistemology; intellectual virtue; open-mindedness; steadfast view;
D O I
10.1111/meta.12346
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
The current debate about disagreement has as rivals those who take the steadfast view and those who affirm conciliationism. Those on the steadfast side maintain that resolute commitment to a belief is reasonable despite peer disagreement. Conciliationists say that peer disagreement necessarily undermines warrant for one's belief. This article discusses the relevance of open-mindedness to the matter of peer disagreement. It shows how both the steadfast and the conciliatory perspective are consistent with a robust and substantive display of open-mindedness. However, it also turns out that there are more ways to display open-mindedness on the steadfast view than on the conciliatory view.
引用
收藏
页码:175 / 189
页数:15
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