The determinants of faculty pay in Russian universities: incentive contracts

被引:3
|
作者
Prakhov, Ilya [1 ]
Rudakov, Victor [1 ]
机构
[1] Natl Res Univ Higher Sch Econ, Ctr Inst Studies, Moscow, Russia
关键词
Academic contracts; faculty pay; incentive contract; merit pay; academic salaries; HIGHER-EDUCATION POLICIES; PUBLIC-SECTOR; ACADEMIC SALARIES; TENURE; PRODUCTIVITY; ISSUES;
D O I
10.1080/21568235.2020.1870243
中图分类号
G40 [教育学];
学科分类号
040101 ; 120403 ;
摘要
This paper evaluates the design of current contractual incentive mechanisms in Russian universities after recent significant contractual reforms in the national academic sector. We employ the theoretical framework of incentive contracts in order to identify and assess performance measures of university faculty determining the total income received from teaching, research and administrative duties. We show that for the entire sample, faculty salary is positively associated with publication activity. Teaching is significant only for the entire sample, but not significant for research-oriented universities and HEIs with no special status. Administrative duties (expressed in the position held) are positively related to faculty pay: the largest effect is for rectors and vice-rectors, but for deans and heads of departments or laboratories the effect is also strong. Heads of universities and structural units receive a significant bonus for their administrative position. For research-oriented universities the largest effect in publication activity is for the number of papers in high ranking journals. In universities with no research status we discovered a significant gender gap: the male faculty earn more than their female colleagues. There is a positive linear relationship between salary and seniority for the entire sample and in universities with no special status.
引用
收藏
页码:408 / 431
页数:24
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