Environmental regulation and responses of local governments

被引:24
|
作者
Ye, Bing [1 ]
Lin, Ling [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Nanjing Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Publ Finance & Taxat, Nanjing, Peoples R China
[2] Jinan Univ, Coll Econ, Guangzhou, Peoples R China
[3] Guangdong Shunde Rural Commercial Bank Co Ltd, Res Inst, Shunde, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Environmental regulation; Taxation; Local government expenditure; Two control zones; China; DIRECT-INVESTMENT EVIDENCE; NATURAL EXPERIMENT; AIR; TAX; POLLUTION; CHINA; IMPACT;
D O I
10.1016/j.chieco.2020.101421
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In 1998, China approved the setup of two control zones and implemented stringent environmental regulation in these zones. This policy enables us to use the difference-in-difference method to investigate local governments' responses to environmental regulation. We find that tough environmental regulation increases tax rate but does not affect local government expenditure. Among the mechanisms through which environmental regulation positively affects tax rate are the negative effects of environmental regulation on investment of fixed assets, number and total profits of above-scale industrial firms in dirty industries of TCZ cities. In addition, the effect of environmental regulation on tax rate is positively related to policy strength and proportion of the secondary industry. Moreover, tough environmental regulation increases the shares of revenue from enterprises and agricultural taxes in budgetary revenue, but decreases the share of value-added tax in budgetary revenue. These findings highlight additional cost of environmental regulation (aside from those mentioned in literature), including increased burdens of the private sector that would lead to large distortions, and aggravated unfair distribution of taxes. The additional cost should be considered when evaluating the environmental policy.
引用
收藏
页数:14
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