Extending communication-proof equilibrium to infinite games

被引：0
|
作者：
Ferreira, JL [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Carlos III Madrid, Dept Econ, Madrid 28903, Spain
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2001年 / 72卷 / 03期
关键词：
Communication-proof; infinite games; stable sets;
D O I：
10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00445-1
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
The concept of Communication-proof equilibrium is extended to infinite games. To that end we make use of abstract stable sets as defined by Greenberg in his Theory of Social Situations. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：303 / 307
页数：5
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