Market power and R&D investment: the case of China

This article presents an in-depth analysis of market power and its impact on firm research and development (R&D) investment in China. Two opposing theories have been proposed in the literature. The first, due to Schumpeter, suggests that monopoly power has a positive effect on firms' propensity to innovate hence their investment in R&D. The alternative view, first proposed by Arrow, suggests that firms invest in R&D in order to escape competition, and thus market competition stimulates innovation. In testing these theories, prior studies have measured market power in different ways. Some use the so-called Lerner index, which measures the profit margin of a particular firm. Others use measures of industry concentration, for example, the Herfindahl index. This article tests the competing theories using a sample of 300,095 Chinese manufacturing firms in 29 two-digit manufacturing industries. We unify the two measures of market power, using a hierarchical linear model, to determine whether industry-level measures add power to specifications based on firm-level markups alone. We find, first, that firms are less likely to carry out R&D activities as their market power intensifies. The effect is nonlinear: firms with higher markups spend even less on R&D than a linear specification predicts. This finding supports Arrow's theory and contradicts Schumpeter's theory. Second, for the sample as a whole, the impact of industry-level concentration is negligible. However, when we break the sample into large, medium, and small firms, industry concentration has a significant effect on large and medium-sized firms but no impact on small firms. Thus, large firms with high markups in concentrated industries spend less on R&D than large firms with high markups in less concentrated industries. We interpret this as further evidence in support of the escape competition theory: less concentrated industries are more competitive, forcing the leaders to invest more heavily on R&D.