Prudence and morality: Socrates versus moral philosophers

Socrates thinks that morality is identical to prudence. Many contemporary moral philosophers would give roughly three reasons for postulating the existence of a morality that is distinct from prudence. These are the Happiness of Tyrants Objection, the Intentions Matter Objection and the Kantian Objection. I explain how Socrates can argue against these three objections. First, he argues that tyrants cannot in fact be happy, that is, there could be no action that harms others and yet benefits the agent given the way the world is. Second, he argues that everyone's intentions are the same and that people differ only in their beliefs about what is in fact best for themselves. Third, he argues, contrary to what a Kantian would suppose, that a non-arbitrary, God-independent and non-vague function for humans is discoverable. If these three arguments can be filled out successfully, then we are in need of radical revisions in our moral theorising. For one such example, we shall no longer be able to start our moral theorising from the familiar 'crossroads experience', where allegedly we are faced with doing either the morally right action or the prudentially beneficial action. That description of our experience will be false because morality and prudence could not be independent of each other, as the description requires. A more accurate description will involve, instead, a conflict between two difference calculations concerning our real prudential good: one emphasising our short-term benefit and the other our long-term benefit.