The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension

被引:1
|
作者
Luo, Xiao [1 ]
Qian, Xuewen [2 ]
Sun, Yang [3 ]
机构
[1] Natl Univ Singapore, Dept Econ, Singapore 117570, Singapore
[2] Univ Nottingham Ningbo, Sch Econ, Ningbo 315100, Peoples R China
[3] Sichuan Univ, Sch Econ, Chengdu 610065, Peoples R China
关键词
Extensive forms; Generic payoffs; Perfect rationality; Sequential rationality; MACA; Semi-algebraic sets; RATIONALIZABLE CONJECTURAL EQUILIBRIUM; SELF-CONFIRMING EQUILIBRIUM; GENERIC FINITENESS; WEAK DOMINANCE; EQUIVALENCE; BEHAVIOR; NASH;
D O I
10.1007/s00199-020-01259-z
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We extend the generic equivalence result of Blume and Zame (Econometrica 62:783-794, 1994) to a broader context of perfectly and sequentially rational strategic behavior (including equilibrium and nonequilibrium behavior) through a unifying solution concept of "mutually acceptable course of action" (MACA) proposed by Greenberg et al. (Econ Theory 40:91-112, 2009. 10.1007/s00199-008-0349-5). As a by-product, we show, in the affirmative, Dekel et al.'s (J Econ Theory 89:165-185, 1999) conjecture on the generic equivalence between the sequential and perfect versions of rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium.
引用
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页码:579 / 601
页数:23
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