How We Know What Not To Think

被引:59
|
作者
Phillips, Jonathan [1 ]
Morris, Adam [2 ]
Cushman, Fiery [2 ]
机构
[1] Dartmouth Coll, Program Cognit Sci, 201 Reed Hall, Hanover, NH 03755 USA
[2] Harvard Univ, Dept Psychol, 33 Kirkland St, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
OPTION-GENERATION; MORAL JUDGMENTS; CHILDRENS; MODEL; INDIVIDUALS; ATTRIBUTION; INTUITIONS; NORMALITY; KNOWLEDGE; MODALITY;
D O I
10.1016/j.tics.2019.09.007
中图分类号
B84 [心理学]; C [社会科学总论]; Q98 [人类学];
学科分类号
03 ; 0303 ; 030303 ; 04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
Humans often represent and reason about unrealized possible actions - the vast infinity of things that were not (or have not yet been) chosen. This capacity is central to the most impressive of human abilities: causal reasoning, planning, linguistic communication, moral judgment, etc Nevertheless, how do we select possible actions that are worth considering from the infinity of unrealized actions that are better left ignored? We review research across the cognitive sciences, and find that the possible actions considered by default are those that are both likely to occur and generally valuable. We then offer a unified theory of why. We propose that Macros! diverse cognitive tasks, the possible actions we consider are biased towards those of genera, practical utility, and (ii) a plausible primary function for this mechanism resides in decision making.
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页码:1026 / 1040
页数:15
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