Locked Up by a Lockup: Valuing Liquidity as a Real Option

被引:27
|
作者
Ang, Andrew [1 ]
Bollen, Nicolas P. B. [2 ]
机构
[1] Columbia Univ, Columbia Business Sch, New York, NY 10027 USA
[2] Vanderbilt Univ, Owen Grad Sch Management, Nashville, TN USA
关键词
HEDGE FUND; PERFORMANCE; RISK; ILLIQUIDITY; RETURN; STOCK;
D O I
10.1111/j.1755-053X.2010.01104.x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Hedge funds often impose lockups and notice periods to limit the ability of investors to withdraw capital. We model the investor's decision to withdraw capital as a real option and treat lockups and notice periods as exercise restrictions. Our methodology incorporates time-varying probabilities of hedge fund failure and optimal early exercise. We estimate a two-year lockup with a three-month notice period costs approximately 1% of the initial investment for an investor with constant relative risk aversion utility and risk aversion of three. The cost of illiquidity can easily exceed 10% if the hedge fund manager can arbitrarily suspend withdrawals.
引用
收藏
页码:1069 / 1095
页数:27
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