Hedge funds often impose lockups and notice periods to limit the ability of investors to withdraw capital. We model the investor's decision to withdraw capital as a real option and treat lockups and notice periods as exercise restrictions. Our methodology incorporates time-varying probabilities of hedge fund failure and optimal early exercise. We estimate a two-year lockup with a three-month notice period costs approximately 1% of the initial investment for an investor with constant relative risk aversion utility and risk aversion of three. The cost of illiquidity can easily exceed 10% if the hedge fund manager can arbitrarily suspend withdrawals.
机构:
George Washington Univ, Sch Business, Washington, DC 20052 USA
Univ Verona, Dept Econ, I-37129 Verona, ItalyGeorge Washington Univ, Sch Business, Washington, DC 20052 USA
Gamba, Andrea
Fusari, Nicola
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Univ Lugano, CH-6900 Lugano, Switzerland
Swiss Finance Inst, CH-1211 Geneva, SwitzerlandGeorge Washington Univ, Sch Business, Washington, DC 20052 USA
机构:
Tufts Med Ctr, Ctr Evaluat Value & Risk Hlth, Inst Clin Res & Hlth Policy Studies, 800 Washington St, Boston, MA 02111 USATufts Med Ctr, Ctr Evaluat Value & Risk Hlth, Inst Clin Res & Hlth Policy Studies, 800 Washington St, Boston, MA 02111 USA
Li, Meng
Garrison, Louis P.
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Univ Washington, CHOICE Inst, Sch Pharm, Seattle, WA USATufts Med Ctr, Ctr Evaluat Value & Risk Hlth, Inst Clin Res & Hlth Policy Studies, 800 Washington St, Boston, MA 02111 USA