The Political Logic of Protest Repression in China

被引:21
|
作者
Goebel, Christian [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Vienna, Modern China Studies, Dept East Asian Studies, Vienna, Austria
基金
欧洲研究理事会;
关键词
STATE REPRESSION; LAND EXPROPRIATION; THUGS;
D O I
10.1080/10670564.2020.1790897
中图分类号
K9 [地理];
学科分类号
0705 ;
摘要
Why do China's authorities repress some protests, but not others? By how much do crowd size, violent tactics and protest location increase the likelihood of repression? Based on a newly available dataset of more than 70,000 protest events collected from social media, this article tests three competing explanations of protest repression in China. It finds that repression is closely correlated both with the cost of concessions for local governments and protest intensity. A small-scale and peaceful labor protest in an urban locality very seldom encounters repression, but rural riots against land grabs, evictions or environmental pollution are nearly certain to experience state-sanctioned violence or arrests even if the number of participants is low.
引用
收藏
页码:169 / 185
页数:17
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