The wealth effects of acquiring foreign divested assets

被引:7
|
作者
Jory, Surendranath R. [1 ]
Ngo, Thanh N. [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Sussex, Brighton BN1 9SL, E Sussex, England
[2] E Carolina Univ, Greenville, NC 27858 USA
关键词
Asset selloffs; Divestiture; International mergers & acquisitions; Methods of payment; CROSS-BORDER MERGERS; CORPORATE-CONTROL; SHAREHOLDERS WEALTH; BIDDING FIRMS; ACQUISITIONS; MARKET; PERFORMANCE; RETURNS; TAKEOVERS; GAINS;
D O I
10.1016/j.ibusrev.2014.07.013
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We compare the wealth effects of acquiring assets from a divesting firm (i.e., acquisitions of divested assets) with the acquisitions of an entire organization (i.e., acquisitions of non-divested targets) abroad. We hypothesize that the ability to select the most valuable assets and leave the unwanted ones behind affords bidders greater flexibility in acquisitions of assets as opposed to acquisitions of non-divested targets. We apply event study methodology on a sample of 2137 cross-border M&As from 1986 to 2009 to test our hypothesis. Consistent with our proposition, we find that bidders fare better in acquisitions of divested assets. Our various market-based measures of performance are overwhelmingly in favor of these kinds of acquirers. Consistent with the wealth effects, we also find that the cost of capital charged to buyers of divisions/subsidiaries/assets of an organization is lower compared to buyers of whole/parent corporations abroad. Overall, our findings suggest that bidders who are in a position to bid for specific divisions or subsidiaries or assets of a foreign corporation rather than acquire the whole corporation can extract larger benefits. (C) 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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页码:235 / 245
页数:11
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