The Credit Rating Agencies and Their Contribution to the Financial Crisis

被引:15
|
作者
Mullard, Maurice [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Hull, Kingston Upon Hull HU6 7RX, N Humberside, England
来源
POLITICAL QUARTERLY | 2012年 / 83卷 / 01期
关键词
credit ratings agencies; conflict of interest; financial crisis; mortgage-backed securities;
D O I
10.1111/j.1467-923X.2012.02268.x
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
The credit rating agencies that dominated the ratings of mortgage-backed securities were Moody's and Standard & Poor's. The two agencies rated some 4.3 trillion dollars of bonds as triple AAA, yet within a period of 18 months these same rating agencies downgraded these bonds to below investment grade. This paper seeks to show that the ratings agencies business model, the issuer pays approach, led to major conflicts of interest with both the ratings agencies unable to walk away from a rating. The evidence given by analysts to Congressional Inquiries confirms a cultural revolution within the rating agencies, with analysts feeling unable to question the quality of a rating. Analysts who were described as being awkward by issuers were removed from the rating process. In the meantime, the income for the rating agencies increased from 3 billion dollars to 6 billion dollars, with the CEOs of the rating agencies receiving incomes comparable to the incomes to the CEOs of investment banks.
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页码:77 / 95
页数:19
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