Commercial lending concentration and bank expertise: Evidence from borrower financial statements

被引:57
|
作者
Berger, Philip G. [1 ]
Minnis, Michael [1 ]
Sutherland, Andrew [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Chicago, Booth Sch Business, 5807 S Woodlawn Ave, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
[2] MIT, Sloan Sch Management, 100 Main St, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA
来源
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS | 2017年 / 64卷 / 2-3期
关键词
Commercial lending; Monitoring; Information economics; Lending concentration; Financial statements; Bank regulation; Auditing; Hard and soft information; Theory of the firm; INFORMATION; INDUSTRY; RISK; FIRMS; DEBT; DIVERSIFICATION; SPECIALIZATION; COMPETITION; INVESTMENT; LOANS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jacceco.2017.06.005
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Lending concentration features prominently in models of information acquisition by banks, but empirical evidence on its role is limited. Using bank-level loan exposures, we find banks are less likely to collect audited financial statements from firms in industries and regions in which they have more exposure. These findings are stronger in settings in which adverse selection is acute and muted when the bank lacks experience with an exposure. Our results offer novel evidence on how bank characteristics are related to the type of financial information they use and support theoretical predictions suggesting portfolio concentration reveals a bank's relative expertise. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:253 / 277
页数:25
相关论文
共 50 条