Mind-Body Problem: Beyond Dualism and Physicalism

被引:1
|
作者
Karwowski, Mateusz [1 ]
机构
[1] Uniwersytet Warszawski, Inst Filozofii, Warsaw, Poland
来源
AVANT | 2019年 / 10卷 / 03期
关键词
philosophy of mind; mind-body problem; Wittgenstein; dualism; physicalism;
D O I
10.26913/avant.2019.03.09
中图分类号
C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
03 ; 0303 ;
摘要
In contemporary discussions concerning the relation of the mind to the body, two positions are contrasted with each other: physicalism and dualism. Even if these are not the dominant approaches to the mind-body problem, the fact is that most other positions arise as attempts to find a compromise between these two. This article argues that physicalism and dualism have more in common than is usually assumed. Both accept the key intuition motivating Cartesian dualism, i.e. the view that in the ordinary language we can describe physical and psychological reality in such a way that physical description does not imply anything concerning psychological and vice versa. The argument presented in this paper attempts to show that such descriptions are not possible. This means that there is no sense in talking about two distinct realities: physical and mental. It follows that there is no problem of the mind-body relationship, because the body is a living organism that owes its identity to having the powers and abilities that are the basis for talking about the mind. In addition, the approach proposed here solves the problem of other minds.
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页码:1 / 17
页数:17
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