Does the European Central Bank speak differently when in parliament?

被引:4
|
作者
Fraccaroli, Nicolo [1 ]
Giovannini, Alessandro [2 ]
Jamet, Jean-Francois [2 ]
Persson, Eric [2 ]
机构
[1] Brown Univ, Econ Publ Policy, Providence, RI 02912 USA
[2] European Cent Bank, Frankfurt, Germany
来源
JOURNAL OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES | 2022年 / 28卷 / 03期
关键词
Central bank accountability; central bank communication; European Central Bank; European Parliament; ECB;
D O I
10.1080/13572334.2022.2107809
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
Parliamentary hearings are a fundamental tool to hold independent central banks accountable. However, it is not clear what type of information central banks provide when they communicate with parliaments. In this article, we compare the communication of the European Central Bank (ECB) in parliamentary hearings to its communication in the press conferences. Using text analysis on the ECB President's introductory statements in parliamentary hearings and press conferences from 1998 to 2021, we show that the ECB uses hearings to discuss topics that are less covered in press conferences. We also find that the ECB's policy stance in the hearings tend to reflect the stance in press conferences, and that the degree of language complexity is similar in the two fora. These findings suggest that the ECB mainly uses parliamentary hearings to further explain policy decisions first presented at press conferences but also to put them in a broader context.
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页码:421 / 447
页数:27
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