On the ontological status of geometrical objects in Kant's philosophy of mathematics

In this text some ideas that Kant states about the ontology of geometrical objects are developed. First, once certain components of empirical intuition arc abstracted, pure intuition remains as a result. This is the case because pure intuition is the form of empirical intuition, i.e. it does not correspond to a component that could be present apart from it. Secondly, the parts of space are posterior to it, because they are limitations of it. From this, it can be asserted that the parts of space share its same ontological status. Thirdly, space itself does not exist, although a certain form of reality, that of being an ens imaginarium, is attributed to it by virtue of being the form of phenomena, of which it is possible to affirm that they really exist. On the basis of the foregoing it can be stated that geometrical objects are entia imaginaria.