Insider ownership, governance mechanisms, and corporate bond around the world

被引:3
|
作者
Bauer, Rob [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Derwall, Jeroen [1 ,2 ,4 ]
Pankratz, Nora [5 ]
机构
[1] Maastricht Univ, Sch Business & Econ, Dept Finance, Tongersestr 53, NL-6211 LM Maastricht, Netherlands
[2] Maastricht Univ, European Ctr Sustainable Finance ECCE, Maastricht, Netherlands
[3] Int Ctr Pens Management ICPM, 20 Carlton St, Toronto, ON M5B 2H5, Canada
[4] Univ Utrecht, Sch Business & Econ, Kriekenpitpl 21-22, NL-3584 EC Utrecht, Netherlands
[5] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Luskin Sch Publ Affairs, 337 Charles Young Dr E, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA
关键词
Corporate bonds; Insider ownership; Tunnelling; AGENCY COSTS; FIRM; INCENTIVES; VALUATION; RATINGS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jimonfin.2021.102423
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We investigate the effect of insider ownership on corporate bond yield spreads from 2003 to 2014 using a sample of 10,460 bonds issued by 1,222 non-financial firms from 44 coun-tries. Using this sample, we find on average that greater insider ownership is associated with a higher yield spread. We consider consumption of private benefits as an economic channel through which insider ownership hurts bondholders. Using a global index of shareholder rights, we observe that the positive association between insider ownership and the spread decreases for firms with relatively stronger shareholder rights in which consumption of private benefits is less likely to occur. Furthermore, we report that in firms with more insider ownership the probability of related-party transactions is larger whereas their accounting return on assets is weaker, ceteris paribus. Taken together, the results indicate that bondholders anticipate that greater insider ownership facilitates consump-tion of private benefits, with implications for the valuation of corporate debt. (c) 2021 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页数:20
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