Incentive compatible mechanism based on linear pricing scheme for single-minded auction

被引：0
|
作者：
Chen, N [1 ]
Zhu, H [1 ]
机构：
[1] Fudan Univ, Dept Comp Sci, Shanghai, Peoples R China
来源：
ADVANCES IN COMPUTING SCIENCE - ASIAN 2003: PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES AND DISTRIBUTED COMPUTATION | 2003年 / 2896卷
关键词：
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
TP31 [计算机软件];
学科分类号：
081202 ; 0835 ;
摘要：
In this paper, we study incentive compatible mechanism based on linear pricing scheme for single-minded auction, a restricted case of combinatorial auction, in which each buyer desires a unique fixed bundle of various commodities, improving the previous works [1, 11, 13] on pricing bundles (i.e., payments of buyers).
引用
收藏
页码：161 / 172
页数：12
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