Observability Increases the Demand for Commitment Devices

被引：17
|
作者：
Exley, Christine L. [1 ]
Naecker, Jeffrey K. [2 ]
机构：
[1] Harvard Sch Business, Negotiat Org & Markets Unit, Boston, MA 02163 USA
[2] Wesleyan Univ, Dept Econ, Middletown, CT 06459 USA
来源：
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE | 2017年 / 63卷 / 10期
基金：
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词：
field experiment; commitment; signaling; time inconsistency; CONSPICUOUS CONSUMPTION; SELF-CONTROL; INCENTIVES; SAVINGS; MOTIVATION; BEHAVIOR; CHOICE; KENYA; IMAGE; DONT;
D O I：
10.1287/mnsc.2016.2501
中图分类号：
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号：
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要：
Previous research often interprets the choice to restrict one's future opportunity set as evidence for sophisticated time inconsistency. We propose an additional mechanism that may contribute to the demand for commitment technology: the desire to signal to others. We present a field experiment where participants can choose to give up money if they do not follow through with an action. When commitment choices are made public rather than kept private, we find significantly higher uptake rates.
引用
收藏
页码：3262 / 3267
页数：6
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