THE RESISTANCE OF PERCEPTION TO KANTIAN TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYSIS. MERLEAU-PONTY'S PROJECT OF A RADICAL REFLECTION

It is evaluated the possibility of characterizing Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology as transcendental. Staffing from the critique to the problem of affection in Kant, developed in Th Structure of Behaviour (section 1), there are made explicit the diffifficulies of adopting a formalist approach of consciousness, together with. Merleau-Ponty's alternative proposal (section 2), Subsequently, it is vindicated perception as apprehension of structures and existences, against the intellectualistic approach of the Critique (section 3). Finally, it is argued that the issues previously developed expresses the merleau-ponryan project of undertake a radical reflection which implies recogrnizing the body as the subject of perception and redefining the a priest (section 4). It is concluded that his position is incompatible with transcendental philosophy.