Decentralisation in Times of Crisis: Asset Or Liability? The Case of Germany and Italy During Covid-19

How did the legal and political-administrative relationship between central and local governments of two decentralised states shape their response to COVID-19? Literature and theories on decentralisation argue that federal and decentralised states are less able to respond to crises in a coordinated manner due to their perceived greater susceptibility to political conflict. Situated within this theoretical debate and based on the analysis of legal acts, political decisions, and relevant national news media articles between March and August 2020 in Germany and Italy, this research note shows that, counterintuitively, more decentralisation does not necessarily translate into more legal and political stress during pandemic management. In responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, Germany, a highly decentralised state, experienced less legal and political tensions than the less decentralised Italy. The key to understanding this variation lies in different institutional arrangements, complemented by the specific political cultures of both states.