Incomplete Regulation, Competition, and Entry in Increasing Returns to Scale Industries

被引:2
|
作者
Biancini, Sara [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Cergy Pontoise, THEMA, F-95000 Cergy Pontoise, France
关键词
STRATEGIC TRADE-POLICY; YARDSTICK COMPETITION; ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; PRIVATIZATION; COST; COUNTRIES; OLIGOPOLY; DESIGN; MARKET; STATE;
D O I
10.1111/j.1467-9779.2010.01483.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The paper analyzes the effects of liberalization in increasing returns to scale industries. It determines the optimal regulation of an incumbent competing with an unregulated strategic competitor, when public funds are costly. The model reveals the trade-off between productive and allocative efficiency. Moreover, the welfare gains from liberalization, as compared with regulated monopoly, are a nonmonotonic function of the cost of public funds. Finally, in the case of severe governmental cash constraints, incomplete regulation may dominate the full regulation of duopoly.
引用
收藏
页码:1003 / 1026
页数:24
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