Ambiguity, social opinion and the use of common property resources

被引:0
|
作者
Diamantaras, Dimitrios [1 ]
Gilles, Robert P. [2 ]
机构
[1] Temple Univ, Dept Econ, Philadelphia, PA 19122 USA
[2] Queens Univ, Sch Management, Belfast BT7 1NN, Antrim, North Ireland
关键词
Common resource game; Pollution abatement; Environment; Ambiguity; Social opinion; INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS; UNCERTAINTY;
D O I
10.1016/j.jebo.2011.03.008
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In this paper we argue that ambiguity, combined with social opinion formation, can be used as the foundation of a game-theoretic equilibrium concept that transcends the standard Nash equilibrium concept, applied to a model of the tragedy of the commons. Our approach sheds light on the international environmental crisis and the relevant ongoing international negotiations. We conclude that social opinion formation in most cases has a significant impact on equilibrium common property resource usage. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码:210 / 222
页数:13
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