We find that connections CEOs develop with top executives and directors through their appointment decisions increase the risk of corporate fraud. Appointment-based CEO connectedness in executive suites and boardrooms increases the likelihood of committing fraud and decreases the likelihood of detection. Additionally, it decreases the expected costs of fraud by helping conceal fraudulent activity, making CEO dismissal less likely upon discovery, and lowering the coordination costs of carrying out illegal activity. Connections based on network ties through past employment, education, or social organization memberships have insignificant effects on fraud. Appointment-based CEO connectedness warrants attention from regulators, investors, and corporate governance specialists.
机构:
Macau Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, Macau, Peoples R ChinaMacau Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, Macau, Peoples R China
Song, Chen
Chen, Leqin
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机构:
Shenzhen Technol Univ, Finance Innovat & FinTech Res Ctr, Business Sch, Shenzhen, Peoples R China
Shenzhen Technol Univ, Business Sch, 3002 Lantian Rd, Shenzhen, Guangdong, Peoples R ChinaMacau Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, Macau, Peoples R China
机构:
Nova Southeastern Univ, H Wayne Huizenga Sch Business & Entrepreneurship, Finance, Ft Lauderdale, FL 33314 USANova Southeastern Univ, H Wayne Huizenga Sch Business & Entrepreneurship, Finance, Ft Lauderdale, FL 33314 USA