Representationalism and Husserlian Phenomenology

According to contemporary representationalism, phenomenal qualia-of specifically sensory experiences-supervene on representational content. Most arguments for representationalism share a common, phenomenological premise: the so-called "transparency thesis." According to the transparency thesis, it is difficult-if not impossible-to distinguish the quality or character of experiencing an object from the perceived properties of that object. In this paper, I show that Husserl would react negatively to the transparency thesis; and, consequently, that Husserl would be opposed to at least two versions of contemporary representationalism. First, I show that Husserl would be opposed to strong representationalism, since he believes the cognitive content of a perceptual episode can vary despite constancy of sensory qualia. Second, I then show that Husserl would be opposed to weak representationalism, since he believes that sensory qualia-specifically, the sort that he calls "kinesthetic sensations"aEuro"can vary despite constancy in representational content.