Dynamics of managerial power and CEO compensation in the course of corporate distress: Evidence from 1992 to 2019

被引：0

作者：

Guo, Sheng ^{[1
]}

Kang, Qiang ^{[2
]}

Mitnik, Oscar A. ^{[3
,4
]}

机构：

[1] Florida Int Univ, Dept Econ, Miami, FL 33199 USA

[2] Florida Int Univ, Dept Finance, Miami, FL 33199 USA

[3] Interamer Dev Bank, Washington, DC USA

[4] IZA Inst Lab Econ, Bonn, Germany

来源：

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT | 2022年 / 51卷 / 03期

关键词：

EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; MATCHING ESTIMATORS; MANAGEMENT TURNOVER; FINANCIAL RATIOS; PERFORMANCE; FIRMS; INCENTIVES; PREDICTION; GOVERNANCE; BANKRUPTCY;

D O I：

10.1111/fima.12384

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We study the dynamics of two governance constructs, managerial influence over the board of directors and chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, in firms undergoing distress during 1992-2019. Data show a clear trend that governance improves over time, which confounds the inference about the effects of distress on governance. Controlling for the secular changes with a bias-corrected matching estimator, we find that distressed firms reduce managerial board appointments and CEO pay, intensify managerial incentive alignment, and increase CEO turnover. The bulk of CEO compensation changes in distressed firms derives from the performance-related part of compensation, consistent with the "shareholder value" view of CEO compensation.

引用

页码：797 / 825

页数：29

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