The value of cash holdings in hotel firms

Extant research in finance suggests asymmetric information increases the cost of external financing substantially and creates underinvestment problems. While franchising might reduce underinvestment problems, it might exacerbate overinvestment problems in poorly-governed firms. Using combined postulations from both the pecking order theory and the free cash flow theory, this study examines the value of cash holdings in hotel firms and the extent to which franchising, financial constraints, and corporate governance affect this value. The findings suggest that cash can be a curse and a blessing; cash is more valuable for financially constrained firms than for unconstrained firms and less valuable for poorly-governed firms than for well-governed firms. Also, financial constraints have a greater effect on the value of cash holdings than weak corporate governance. Although franchising could solve underinvestment problems, it makes poorly-governed firms more vulnerable to overinvestment. Practical and theoretical implications are discussed within realms of corporate finance and franchising. (C) 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.