A truthful mechanism for classroom wireless range auction

被引：0
|
作者：
Ji, Yue [1 ]
Zhang, Yuan [2 ,3 ]
Guan, Shaopeng [2 ,3 ]
机构：
[1] Nanjing Univ, Tian Jia Bing Hall, Nanjing 210097, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
[2] Nanjing Univ, State Key Lab Novel Software Technol, Nanjing 210046, Peoples R China
[3] Nanjing Univ, Comp Sci & Technol Dept, Nanjing 210046, Peoples R China
来源：
2014 IEEE 11TH CONSUMER COMMUNICATIONS AND NETWORKING CONFERENCE (CCNC) | 2014年
关键词：
Education; wireless network; communication range; auction; incentives; truthfulness; WIFI;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
TP3 [计算技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号：
0812 ;
摘要：
Networking technologies have been widely applied in education nowadays. Consider a school building with multiple classrooms. Each classroom establishes a LAN using one router for teachers and students inside it. When several routers are close to each other, if they use the same channel, they can interfere with each other. In order to avoid interference, these routers can determine their ranges through an auction. In this paper, we present a mechanism for such wireless range auctions. Our mechanism is truthful in that, under our mechanism, each wireless router has incentives to reveal its true valuation function.
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收藏
页数：6
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