Quality signaling through certification in developing countries

被引:36
|
作者
Auriol, Emmanuelle [1 ,2 ]
Schilizzi, Steven G. M. [3 ]
机构
[1] Toulouse Sch Econ, ARQADE, Toulouse, France
[2] IDEI, Toulouse, France
[3] Univ Western Australia, Fac Sci, Agr & Resource Econ, Nedlands, WA 6009, Australia
关键词
Credence good; Quality signaling; Certification; Developing countries; Seeds; FAIR TRADE; CREDENCE GOODS; INFORMATION; COMPETITION; DISCLOSURE; PROVISION; IMPACT; PRICE;
D O I
10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.03.007
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper studies how signaling the credence attributes of consumer goods distorts their market equilibrium in developing countries. Costs of certification, sunk in order to achieve credibility, play a key role in producing an oligopolistic market, leading to high prices that form a barrier for consumers in the South. To lower the cost, certification is better achieved by a single independent body which can be financed either by end consumers, through a fee, or by public subsidies. The paper identifies the conditions under which each funding mechanism is most efficient, taking into account the government's budget constraint. The theoretical analysis is motivated with reference to agricultural seed certification. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
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页码:105 / 121
页数:17
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