Does foreign exchange intervention signal future monetary policy?

被引:24
|
作者
Kaminsky, GL
Lewis, KK
机构
[1] UNIV PENN,WHARTON SCH,PHILADELPHIA,PA 19104
[2] NATL BUR ECON RES,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02138
[3] FED RESERVE SYST,BOARD GOVERNORS,WASHINGTON,DC 20551
关键词
monetary policy; foreign exchange intervention;
D O I
10.1016/0304-3932(96)01251-2
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
A frequently cited explanation for why foreign exchange interventions affect the exchange rate is that these interventions signal future monetary policy intentions. This explanation says that central banks signal a more contractionary monetary policy in the future by buying domestic currency today. Therefore, the expectations of future tighter monetary policy make the domestic currency appreciate, even though the current monetary effects of the intervention are typically offset by central banks. Of course, this explanation presumes that central banks in fact back up interventions with subsequent changes in monetary policy. In this paper, we empirically examine this presumption.
引用
收藏
页码:285 / 312
页数:28
相关论文
共 50 条