The Effects of a Supervisor's Active Intervention in Subordinates' Judgments, Directional Goals, and Perceived Technical Knowledge Advantage on Audit Team Judgments
被引:56
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作者:
Peecher, Mark E.
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机构:
Univ Illinois, Urbana, IL 61801 USAUniv Illinois, Urbana, IL 61801 USA
Peecher, Mark E.
[1
]
Piercey, M. David
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h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003 USAUniv Illinois, Urbana, IL 61801 USA
Piercey, M. David
[2
]
Rich, Jay S.
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h-index: 0
机构:
Illinois State Univ, Normal, IL 61761 USAUniv Illinois, Urbana, IL 61801 USA
Rich, Jay S.
[3
]
Tubbs, Richard M.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242 USAUniv Illinois, Urbana, IL 61801 USA
audit team judgments;
client pressure;
directional goals;
active intervention;
technical knowledge;
CONFLICTS-OF-INTEREST;
CLIENT;
EXPECTATIONS;
HEURISTICS;
STANDARDS;
PREPARERS;
EXPOSURE;
ABILITY;
SEARCH;
D O I:
10.2308/accr.2010.85.5.1763
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
Prior research shows that an audit supervisor's active intervention in a subordinate's judgment distorts that judgment. However, subordinates' judgments are only one input into audit team judgments. How do supervisors finalize audit team judgments after actively intervening in their subordinates' judgments? In an experiment using audit teams, supervisors with weaker or stronger goals to reach a client-preferred conclusion either were or were not asked to first actively coach a subordinate's judgment (i.e., active intervention) before reviewing it and finalizing the audit team's judgment. Supervisors' intervention influenced subordinates' inputs, which, in turn, supervisors incorporated into their final judgments. More interestingly, intervention biased supervisors' final judgments, controlling for supervisor directional goal strength and for concurrent effects on subordinates' inputs. However, supervisors distorted their judgments less as they perceived a larger technical knowledge advantage over subordinates. In a second experiment, auditors appear aware of the bias-reducing knowledge advantage effects but unaware of the bias-increasing active intervention effects. We discuss implications for audit team judgments and audit quality control.